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**NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE
VISIT (NSSAV) PROGRAM**

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This Instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 91-1, Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety. This publication is consistent with AFPD 13-5, *Nuclear Enterprise*. It establishes key components of the nuclear surety program according to guidance in AFI 91-101, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program. This instruction assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for conducting Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits (NSSAV) and provides guidance to all levels of command participating in the NSSAV process. It applies to designated directorates, Numbered Air Force (NAF) and Center staff agencies, parent wing main operating bases when augmenting the NSSAV team, and all units participating in the NSSAV. It applies to Air Force Reserve (AFR) and Air National Guard (ANG) units participating in the nuclear mission combined with Air Force units or using Air Force aircraft. Ensure local instructions or supplements are created in accordance with AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management. Send major command (MAJCOM) supplements to this Instruction to Headquarters Air Force Safety Center (AFSC/SEW), 9700 G Avenue SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670, and

to Air Force Chief of Safety (AF/SE) for coordination. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Form 847s from the field through the appropriate functional's chain of command. This instruction directs collecting information subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 authorized by AFI 21-204, Nuclear Weapon Procedures. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, Maintain records created as a result of prescribed processes IAW AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af61a/afirms/afirms/>. System of records notice (Serious Incident

Reports (June 11, 1997, 62 FR 31793) applies. Contact supporting records managers as required. Refer recommended changes and conflicts between this and other publications, using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication, to the Air Force Safety Center (HQ AFSC/SEW), 9700 Avenue G SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670.

(ACC) AFI91-121, 8 Nov 2010, is supplemented as follows: It consolidates the procedures and criteria that support Air Combat Command's (ACC) Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit program. It applies to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) or Air National Guard (ANG) units participating in the nuclear mission combined with ACC units or using ACC aircraft. This instruction requires the collection and maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. System of Record Notices (SORN) F031 AF SP O, Documentation for Identification and Entry Authority, apply. Ensure local instructions or supplements are created in accordance with AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/afirms/afirms/afirms/rims.cfm>. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF IMT 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate chain of command to the ACC Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration Directorate (HQ ACC/A10), 190 Thornell Ave, Langley AFB VA 23665-2791. See Attachment 1 for a glossary of reference and supporting information.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This interim change (IC) adds new language in the introductory paragraph, specifically the second sentence, to make this publication consistent with AFD 13-5, *Nuclear Enterprise*. This IC also adds AFD 13-5 in the reference section of Attachment 1.

(ACC) This supplement has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. Major changes include: removal of references to bomb wings which have moved to AF Global Strike Command, guidance pertaining to formal process to address significant observations, and updated organization from A3S to A10.

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Chapter 1

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT PROGRAM.

1.1. Scope of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) Program. The Secretary of the Air Force established the NSSAV program to assist nuclear tasked units, on a non-attribution basis, in maintaining effective nuclear surety programs. The NSSAV is an opportunity to receive assistance from experienced headquarters personnel who write nuclear surety policy and guidance. It is not an inspection nor is it intended to prepare units to pass Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI). NSSAV will not give a rating, score, grade, or assessment statements about units, however if the NSSAV team identifies critical systemic deficiencies, they can recommend that the wing conduct root cause analysis of each critical deficiency and provide results to the NSSAV Lead Division or Team Chief. Assessment statements will be limited to processes and procedures. [Attachment 2](#) outlines typical areas observed during an NSSAV. Wing commanders may use the NSSAV results to strengthen the unit Nuclear Surety Program. MAJCOMs will designate a division (lead division) as Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for the NSSAV program. This division will coordinate with other HQ divisions on nuclear surety staff assistance visit policy issues and guidance. Applicable HQ staff agencies act as offices of collateral responsibility (OCR). The NSSAV also provides an opportunity for resolution and clarification of issues between the unit and headquarters functional managers. The objective is threefold:

1.1. (ACC)HQ ACC Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate (ACC/A10) manages the NSSAV program and coordinates with other HQ ACC directorates on nuclear surety policy issues and guidance. Applicable HQ ACC staff agencies act as offices of collateral responsibility.

1.1.1. Determine if higher headquarters guidance is adequate and clear.

1.1.2. Provide feedback to the wing commander on whether the unit is properly applying sound procedures to implement Nuclear Surety guidance.

1.1.3. Provide situational awareness on command nuclear surety to senior leadership in the form of an NSSAV executive summary and annual crossfeed report.

1.2. Assistance Areas. NSSAV team assesses all areas included in CJCSI 3263.05, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection*, and AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities* as supplemented. Additional areas may be assessed by MAJCOM staffs as time permits or when requested by MAJCOM/CC or wing leadership.

1.2.1. **(Added-ACC)** Random nuclear surety testing will be administered to a minimum of 15% of available PRP personnel in the wing (i.e. not on TDY/leave). A passing score is 80%.

1.2.2. **(Added-ACC)** Between 5-20% of personnel and medical PRP records will be audited (if applicable) for compliance with governing DoD and AF guidance.

1.2.3. **(Added-ACC)** Command Post Controller closed book testing will be administered to 100% of available certified controllers (i.e. not on TDY/leave or just ending a 12-hour CP shift). A passing score is 90%.

1.2.4. **(Added-ACC)** One Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable (SCAMP) set-up crew will be observed during the NSSAV.

1.3. Method of Assessment.

1.3.1. For Weapons Maintenance Technical Operations, NSSAV team member(s) will select team composition for each specific technical operation. Selections will be completely unbiased. To the maximum extent possible, the NSSAV member will ensure equitable observation across all maintenance shifts and avoid observation of the same person on multiple tasks. Assessments will emphasize performance against approved safety, security, and reliability standards.

1.3.2. Team integrity for the weapons load crews will be maintained IAW AFI 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, and AFI 21-202, *Missile and Space Systems Maintenance Management*, requirements. To demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency, they will normally be tasked to perform at least one evaluation of a maintenance operation within their area of responsibility. Unit quality assurance and weapons standardization evaluators may be observed by the NSSAV team.

1.3.3. For Weapon Security, NSSAV functional area experts will use performance based methodology to determine whether a unit meets the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard (NWSS). They will observe the integrated execution of security actions and response (performance), and compliance with technical criteria, as applicable. They will observe execution of applicable plans and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). They will assess the effectiveness of active/passive defenses, deployed delay/denial systems, and other technology. Did the unit use available options to prevent the loss of/deny access to nuclear weapons to the adversary to include destruction of the weapon? To the maximum extent possible, the NSSAV functional area members will develop realistic nuclear security exercise scenarios to determine a unit's ability to meet NWSS. NSSAV team will assess the adequacy of and compliance with approved compensatory measures for MAJCOM approved security deviations.

1.3.4. Random nuclear surety testing will be administered, as per AFI 91-101, to a minimum of 25 percent of available Personnel Reliability Program personnel in the wing (i.e. not on TDY/leave).

1.3.5. A minimum of 5 percent of personnel and medical PRP records will be reviewed for compliance with governing DoD and AF guidance. NSSAV team will review the administrative qualifications, certification, continuing evaluation, removal from PRP duties, return to duty, training and management processes, using record reviews to substantiate above processes employed by the unit. PRP processes, not records reviews will be the primary focus.

1.3.6. Command Post Controller closed book testing will be administered at bases with a strategic (USAFE: Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces Command Post) tasking to 100 percent of available certified controllers (i.e. not on TDY/leave or just ending a 12-hour CP shift).

1.3.7. MAJCOMs will determine additional items to be observed during the NSSAV based upon wing commander input, NAF input and on unique mission requirements.

1.3.8. For associate/Total Force Integration (TFI) units, the active duty unit will have responsibility for the associate/TFI unit outlined in this instruction.

1.4. NSSAV Trip and Event Scheduling.

1.4.1. The lead division schedules all unit NSSAVs and coordinates with appropriate MAJCOM agencies. These visits should occur 6 to 8 months after each unit's last NSI. This interval provides a mid-course assessment point between no-notice NSIs while minimizing the probability of an NSI occurring prior to a scheduled NSSAV. For example, if an NSI occurs in Jul 08, the next NSSAV should be scheduled between Jan-Mar 09. The only exception to this scheduling guidance is when a wing commander requests an out-of-cycle NSSAV. **Exception:** USAFE may deviate from this schedule as required to accommodate host nation requirements and the Functional Expert Visit Program.

1.4.1. (ACC) HQ ACC/A10 schedules all unit NSSAVs. For units that do not receive an NSI, NSSAVs should be scheduled 12-18 months apart. HQ ACC/A10 coordinates visits with appropriate major command (MAJCOM) agencies.

1.4.2. MAJCOMs will provide a notification message to the NAF/Center and unit 60 days prior to the planned visit confirming NSSAV date, lead division point of contact (POC), billeting, transportation and team work center requirements (provide an info copy to the installation-owning MAJCOM if NSSAV is for a tenant unit). Units will appoint a NSSAV POC and forward the name to the MAJCOM within one week of receiving the notification message.

1.4.2. (ACC) HQ ACC/A10 will provide a notification message to the NAF and unit 60 days prior to the planned visit confirming NSSAV date, HQ ACC/A10 point of contact (POC), billeting, transportation and team work center requirements. Units will forward their NSSAV POC name and point of contact to HQ ACC/A10 within one week of receiving the notification message.

1.4.3. Units will locally coordinate and provide inputs on a proposed NSSAV Schedule of Events. They are encouraged to identify special emphasis areas affecting nuclear surety. Units will send a draft schedule to the MAJCOM NLT 40 days prior to the scheduled visit. MAJCOMs will ensure the proposed schedule fulfills NSSAV requirements and coordinate the proposed schedule of events within the staff. NSSAV team members will coordinate functional area specific scheduling requirements with their unit POCs. A confirmed schedule of events should be completed NLT 14 days prior to NSSAV team arrival. After the visit and events schedule is confirmed, any scheduling conflicts must be immediately brought to the attention of the MAJCOM NSSAV POC for resolution.

1.4.3. (ACC) Units will send a draft schedule to HQ ACC/A10 NLT 40 days prior to the scheduled visit. HQ ACC/A10 will ensure the proposed schedule fulfills NSSAV requirements and coordinate the proposed schedule of events within ACC. After the visit and events schedule is confirmed, any scheduling conflicts must be immediately brought to the attention of the HQ ACC/A10 NSSAV POC for resolution.

1.4.4. For installations that have Weapons Storage Area (WSA) production capability managed by AFMC, the supported operational wing and supporting AFMC Munitions squadron should receive a joint NSSAV. ACC, AFSPC, and AFGSC will make every effort to coordinate with AFMC to ensure that their units receive an NSSAV at the same time. The

teams should coordinate the timing of exercises and other events to maximize synergy. This reduces the footprint on the installation receiving the NSSAV, and associated activities that will be observed require cooperation between the supported wing and the WSA. AFMC may conduct limited NSSAVs focused on WSA activities and will limit their scope to only those areas for which AFMC is responsible. In doing so, AFMC should try to minimize impact to supported wings as much as possible.

1.4.4.1. For Multi-MAJCOM NSSAVs, fully coordinate a joint schedule of events between the installation, and each participating MAJCOM/NAF/Center. Close communications between respective team chiefs is essential to ensure exercises are appropriately scheduled and evaluated and do not interfere with other events, and events are properly synchronized such that access and exposure are minimized (e.g. conduct safety, facility/LPS, alarm system and sensor assessments in conjunction with stockpile assessments as much as possible where appropriate).

1.4.4.2. The host installation should (when possible) receive a joint NSSAV report from ACC, AFSPC, or AFGSC on installations supporting a WSA.

1.4.4.3. The outbrief will be combined for both the host wing and the supporting WSA, with team chiefs from ACC/AFSPC/AFGSC and AFMC briefing the NSSAV results.

1.4.4.4. Critical deficiencies will be resolved as described in paragraph 2.2 within the same MAJCOM. The host wing will resolve its critical deficiencies with AFGSC, and the supporting WSA will resolve its critical deficiency(ies) with AFMC.

1.5. NSSAV Funding. MAJCOMs will ensure that an adequate annual budget and manpower exists to fund all TDY costs associated with providing NSSAV visits to all nuclear wings within 6-8 months after a full NSI (approximately every 12-18 months). The NSSAV budget should be managed by the lead division. MAJCOMs will determine guidance for compensation of civilian NSSAV team members working overtime during the visit.

1.5.1. **(Added-ACC)** HQ ACC/A10 submits an annual budget estimate to ensure funding of the NSSAV program. HQ ACC/A10 provides funding for NSSAV augmentees; however, compensation for any civilian NSSAV team member(s) working overtime during the visit will be the responsibility of the member's assigned office.

1.6. NSSAV Team Composition and Requirements.

1.6.1. MAJCOMs will determine the required size of NSSAV teams. NSSAV team members are drawn from applicable MAJCOM staff agencies. When necessary or desired, other units and/or organizations may augment the team. MAJCOMS will determine the priority for units from which to draw augmentees. Actual NSSAV team size, composition, and requirements will vary according to base and assigned nuclear mission. The team should consist of a cross-functional group of specialists representing the functional areas that contribute to nuclear surety at the wing receiving the NSSAV. MAJCOMs will determine team composition for each base that receives an NSSAV.

1.6.1.1. **(Added-ACC)** NSSAV teams consist of a team chief and up to 20 team members. NSSAV team members are drawn from applicable HQ ACC staff agencies and, when necessary, other units and/or organizations may augment the team as required.

The priority for augmentees is from HQ ACC staff, HQ 12 AF staff, 608 STOS, other MAJCOM staffs, and finally from ACC operational wings.

1.6.2. The division chief of the lead division will normally be the NSSAV team chief. MAJCOMs may designate other personnel as NSSAV team chiefs where appropriate (i.e. limited NSSAVs, division chief availability, etc).

1.6.2. (ACC) HQ ACC/A10 or Deputy will normally be the NSSAV team chief. Officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel and above may serve as team chief.

1.6.2.1. (Added-ACC) Actual team size, composition, and requirements will vary according to base and assigned nuclear surety mission. Refer to Table 1.1 for base-specific requirements.

1.6.3. If available, host wings will provide on base billeting for NSSAV team members. Off base billeting for military members must be approved by the team chief prior to team arrival.

1.6.3. (ACC) Host wings will provide on base billeting for NSSAV team members. Off base billeting must be approved by HQ ACC/A10 prior to NSSAV team arrival.

1.6.4. Government owned vehicles will be provided for team member transportation. MAJCOMs will determine standard requirements.

1.6.4. (ACC) Government owned vehicles will be provided for team member transportation. See Table 1.1 for standard requirements.

1.6.5. MAJCOMs will determine work center requirements. This work center will be accessible to NSSAV team members at all times.

Table 1.1. (Added-ACC) Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Composition

Destination	Team Size (approx)	Vehicles	Duration (days)	HQ ACC/SGPF (PRP)	HQ ACC/A10 (PRP)	HQ ACC/SEW (weap safety)	HQ ACC/A7S (SF)	HQ ACC/A10 (CP)	HQ ACC/A10 (CCC)	HQ ACC/A10 (Ops)	T.C and Deputy TC	HQ ACC/A10 (SCAMP)
BEALE AFB 9 RW	5	3	3					1	1	1	1	1
OFFUTT AFB 55 WG	16	10	5	2	2	1	4	2	1	1	1ea	1

1.6.5. (ACC) Work center requirements include at least three computer systems with internet access, at least six LAN drops for VPN access, a shredder, at least one color duplex printer, one on-call information manager, and team member access to a protected folder on a shared drive. This work center will be accessible by the NSSAV team members at all times.

1.7. NSSAV Duration and Meetings. MAJCOMs will determine the duration of NSSAVs based on mission requirements. Direct interaction between team chief, all team members, the

wing or unit commander and respective staff is highly encouraged to ensure the NSSAV efficiently accomplishes its objectives.

1.7. (ACC)NSSAV Duration and Meetings. NSSAV is normally 3-5 days in duration.

1.7.1. The team chief conducts an inbrief with the wing or unit commander and key staff. This inbrief will normally include:

1.7.1. (ACC) The team chief conducts an in-brief with the wing or unit commander and key staff, normally Tuesday at 0800.

1.7.1.1. Unit Mission Brief for NSSAV Team Members.

1.7.1.2. Any local condition and safety briefings required by the unit (if not accomplished upon NSSAV team arrival).

1.7.1.3. Formal NSSAV inbrief by NSSAV Team Chief.

1.7.2. The team chief conducts an outbrief with the wing or unit commander and designated unit staff. The outbrief location is determined by the wing commander.

1.7.2. (ACC) The team chief conducts an out-brief with the wing or unit commander and designated unit staff, normally on the planned day of departure (typically at 0900). The out-brief location is determined by the wing commander.

1.7.3. Time permitting, functional team leads should conduct an outbrief with the appropriate unit commander.

1.8. Unit Preparation. Units should execute self-inspection checklists in reviewable areas prior to the arrival of the NSSAV Team. This will allow NSSAV members to assist in resolving any problems found and serves as a check on completeness of the wing's self-inspection checklists.

1.8.1. Units will provide a copy of their simulations/deviations to the NSSAV team NLT 14 days prior to the scheduled visit. The NSSAV team chief(s) will approve/disapprove simulations before the visit commences.

Chapter 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT SUMMARY.

2.1. NSSAV Report.

2.1.1. NSSAV reports assist the units in identifying strengths and areas for improvement in order to enhance overall nuclear surety effectiveness. Identified deficiencies will reference governing instructions and guidance (i.e. AFI, MAJCOM Instructions, T.O., USSTRATCOM Publications, etc.) NSSAV reports will be classified IAW CJCSI 3263-05 Enclosure F, para 2.

2.1.2. The NSSAV team project officer uses inputs provided by each functional team member to build the report in accordance with the contents listed at [Attachment 2](#). The NSSAV team chief will provide a draft copy of the NSSAV report to the wing commander prior to the team's departure and provide a copy to the lead division upon return to the staff location. The authority for further distribution resides with the wing and/or MAJCOM/CC. The Air Force Safety Center, AF/A10, MAJCOM Directorates and Special Staff, Associate/TFI MAJCOM, NAF/Center CCs will receive the report's Executive Summary within 20 days. The lead division retains an office record copy on file, and has the option to distribute detailed reports outside of the division with the approval of the MAJCOM/CC. The report will not be distributed to the Inspector General (IG) nor will NSSAV results be discussed with the IG to preserve NSSAV program integrity. Additionally, to preserve program integrity, NSSAV team members will not be used as IG augmentees at a wing where they have performed an NSSAV in the past 12 months.

2.1.2. (ACC) The NSSAV team chief will provide a copy of the NSSAV report to the wing commander prior to the team's departure and provide a copy to HQ ACC/A10 upon return to Langley AFB. HQ ACC/A10 retains an office record copy on file, but will not distribute detailed reports outside of HQ ACC/A10.

2.1.3. Team members include all nuclear surety-related deficiencies (positive/benchmark comments and deficiencies) in the detailed report. Deficiencies will be referenced by instruction and paragraph number to the maximum extent possible. Overall and sub-area ratings are not assigned. Criticality of deficiencies will be determined IAW AFI 90-201 and CJCSI 3263.05. Observations are classified in the following categories:

2.1.3.1. STRENGTH - An observation that highlights strong processes, knowledge, or performance.

2.1.3.2. CRITICAL DEFICIENCY- Any deficiency that would result in an unsatisfactory rating as defined in CJCSI 3263.05 and AFI 90-201 if left uncorrected.

2.1.3.3. SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY- Any deficiency that would result in one or more sub areas being rated as unsatisfactory in CJCSI 3263.05 and AFI 90-201 if left uncorrected.

2.1.3.4. MINOR DEFICIENCY - A deviation from published procedure, local or otherwise, that does not result in an unreliable weapon or an unsafe or unsecure environment.

2.1.3.5. **RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENT AREA** - A suggestion to improve a process. (Does not require referencing governing instructions or guidance).

2.1.4. MAJCOMs will determine the guidance for recognizing Superior Performers.

2.1.4. (ACC) Outstanding performers will be selected by NSSAV team members based on observations made during the visit and will be listed at the end of the report.

2.2. Resolving Critical Deficiencies. Immediately after the NSSAV, the wing commander will provide the lead division with the wing's designated POC who will formally track resolution of critical deficiencies. The wing in cooperation with MAJCOM functional experts should apply 8-step problem solving methodology to deficiencies in order to correct systemic issues. A process change, if required, may be more critical to providing a sustainable solution than correcting an individual deficiency.

2.2. (ACC)Resolving Critical Deficiencies. Immediately after the NSSAV, the wing commander will provide HQ ACC/A10 with the wing's designated POC who will formally track resolution of critical deficiencies.

2.2.1. NLT 60 days after the completion of the NSSAV, the wing will send a follow-up report to the lead division describing corrective actions taken to resolve critical deficiencies.

2.2.1. (ACC) HQ ACC/A10 is designated final authority on closing out any critical/significant deficiencies.

2.2.2. Lead division will forward the resolution to the appropriate OPR within the MAJCOM HQ to determine the effectiveness of the corrective action. The OPR will then recommend either closing out the deficiency or further corrective actions.

2.2.3. Lead division will compile the comments from the OPRs and create a consolidated response to the wing.

2.2.4. The wing must start an immediate collaborative process with the wing and MAJCOM Functional experts to fix the problem, and provide an update to all open critical deficiencies (at a minimum) every 30 days thereafter until closed. Lead division will continue to track observations until resolved. The MAJCOM/CC will designate a final authority on closing out any critical/significant deficiencies.

2.3. Crossfeed Report. Lead division will publish an annual Nuclear Surety Crossfeed Trends and Analysis Report. The report will identify deficiencies and their associated root cause(s) and corrective action(s), but will not attribute the deficiency to a particular wing. NSSAV crossfeed reports will be classified IAW CJCSI 3263.05, Enclosure F, para 2.

2.3.1. Annual Crossfeed reports will be distributed to MAJCOM/CC, MAJCOM NSSAV Division Leads, NAF/Center CCs, AFSC/SEW, and all subordinate units at which NSSAVs occur.

2.3.2. MAJCOMs will determine an appropriate forum for discussing NSSAV-highlighted trends on an annual basis.

2.3.3. Lead division will provide an annual (CY) Crossfeed report NLT 31 Jan each year to other MAJCOMs having a nuclear surety mission, MAJCOM A10 and HAF A10 and MAJCOM A9 for posting in a nuclear surety lessons learned database.

Chapter 3

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

3.1. MAJCOM HQ will designate a directorate/special staff that:

- 3.1.1. Is the Lead Division for NSSAV activity on the MAJCOM staff.
- 3.1.2. Provides guidance to lead division as overall administrator of the NSSAV process.
- 3.1.3. Ensures the lead division centrally manages budgets and administers funds associated with the NSSAV program.

3.2. Lead Division:

3.2. (ACC)HQ ACC/A10:

- 3.2.1. Administers and provides NSSAV program oversight.
- 3.2.2. Ensures all procedures necessary to effectively govern the NSSAV program remain current.
- 3.2.2. (ACC) Ensures all procedures necessary to effectively govern the NSSAV program remain current and are included in this instruction.
- 3.2.3. Ensures team chiefs are appointed and MAJCOM trained for each NSSAV.
- 3.2.4. Appoints an NSSAV Program Manager.
- 3.2.4. (ACC) Appoints an NSSAV Program Manager from the Ops and Integration Division.
- 3.2.5. Publishes annual NSSAV Crossfeed Trends and Analysis Report.

3.3. NSSAV Program Manager:

- 3.3.1. Provides management and oversight of the NSSAV program.
- 3.3.2. Plans, organizes, coordinates, and directs activities affecting the NSSAV program.
- 3.3.3. Develops, coordinates and distributes the annual NSSAV schedule and makes changes as they occur.
- 3.3.4. Provides NSSAV fund cite and Defense Travel System (DTS) Line of Accounting authorization to NSSAV team members.
- 3.3.5. Tracks CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES for trend analysis.
- 3.3.6. Maintains the following information:
 - 3.3.6.1. Lists of all NSSAV locations.
 - 3.3.6.2. Lists of key personnel assigned to each location.
 - 3.3.6.3. NSSAV report archive for each location
 - 3.3.6.4. (Added-ACC) Lists of previous NSSAV team members by functional area.

3.3.7. Authors, consolidates MAJCOM functional organizations' inputs and distributes NSSAV Annual Crossfeed Trends and Analysis Report using the previous year's NSSAV reports as source data.

3.4. NSSAV Team Chiefs:

- 3.4.1. Provide overall direction to the NSSAV.
- 3.4.2. In conjunction with the NSSAV program manager, ensure the size and composition of the NSSAV team and the scope of the NSSAV meets unit needs.
- 3.4.3. Conduct an NSSAV team pre-departure meeting.
- 3.4.4. Ensure the NSSAV team completes the detailed report as outlined in this instruction.
- 3.4.5. Assess senior leadership and key personnel involvement in each unit process during the NSSAV.
- 3.4.6. Ensure all team members have proper security clearances.
- 3.4.7. Ensure advance copy of entry authorization list is transmitted to wing prior to team arrival.
- 3.4.8. Coordinate with other affected MAJCOM team chiefs for planning and scheduling of multi-MAJCOM NSSAVs.
- 3.4.9. Designate team project officer.

3.5. MAJCOM Functional Organizations. Provide qualified personnel for the NSSAV team. The team may be augmented by qualified personnel from other MAJCOM units if MAJCOM personnel are not available. Ensure personnel are appropriately qualified on appropriate nuclear weapons systems.

3.6. NSSAV Team Project Officer. Performs duties as assigned by NSSAV Team Chief.

3.7. NSSAV Team Members. Each member must ensure they have travel orders, military identification and Air Force restricted area badge (if applicable), before they depart for the NSSAV location. NSSAV team members will:

- 3.7.1. Examine applicable portions of the proposed schedule of events to ensure all desired scenarios are presented in logical sequence and that the timing is correct
- 3.7.2. Review pertinent section(s) of prior year's NSSAV/NSI report.
- 3.7.3. Attend NSSAV planning meeting(s) (as required).
- 3.7.4. Provide a copy of DD Form 1610, *Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DoD Personnel*, to the NSSAV POC at least 5 duty days before departure and a copy of the DD Form 1351-2, *Travel Voucher or Sub-voucher*, within 5 duty days of return. Electronic copies of the forms from Defense Travel System (DTS) are preferred.
- 3.7.5. Attend the NSSAV team pre-departure meeting.
- 3.7.6. Conduct each NSSAV consistently against a formal checklist or list of objectives. General objectives should focus on unit training, self inspection, compliance with DoD, USAF and MAJCOM directives, public law (safety and security) and the ability of the unit to accomplish its assigned mission.

3.7.7. Document and submit NSSAV observations to the project officer for report consolidation at designated date and time.

3.7.8. Remain through NSSAV completion and out brief unless approved for early departure by the NSSAV Team Chief.

3.7.9. **(Added-ACC)** Civilian team members will not be required to work beyond their standard duty day during an NSSAV. If there is cause for a civilian employee to work longer than their standard duty day, that civilian team member must get approval/funding for compensatory time or overtime pay from their unit of assignment. Ideally, a blanket approval could be issued by the employee's approving official prior to departing on the trip. HQ ACC/A10 will not be responsible for any overtime associated with an NSSAV.

3.8. Unit Responsibilities. Units will:

3.8.1. Provide a unit point of contact (POC) to NSSAV Program Manager within 5 duty days of initial notification. This position serves as the wing or unit liaison and provides the following support:

3.8.1.1. Provide Program Manager the draft NSSAV schedule of events at least 40 days prior to the visit, using the report topics as outlined in [Attachment 2](#) as a starting point.

3.8.1.2. Assist with billeting and transportation arrangements, as required.

3.8.1.3. Provide a work center, to include stand alone classified/SIPRNET computer processing and printing capability, for the NSSAV team, and any additional administrative and communications support, as required.

3.8.1.4. Ensure host wing and unit Security Forces personnel receive the site access message and an EAL is processed for the team prior to the start of an NSSAV.

3.8.1.5. Coordinate NSSAV outbrief scheduling and location.

GREGORY A. FEEST
Major General, USAF
Chief of Safety

(ACC)

JAMES A. DUNN, GS-15, DAF
Director, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

DoD 5210.42/AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*, 13 November 2006, Change 1, 10 September 08

AFI 20-110, *Nuclear Weapon Related Material Management*, 20 August 2009

AFPD 13-5, *Nuclear Enterprise*, 6 July 2011

AFPD 90-2, *Inspector General--The Inspection System*, 26 April 2006

AFPD 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*, 13 February 2007

AFI 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, 29 Jun 06

AFI 21-202, *Missile and Space Systems Maintenance Management*, 15 Nov 07

AFI 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures*, 17 January 2008 incorporating Change 2, 30 Mar 09

AFMAN 23-110, *USAF Supply Manual*, 1 April 2009

AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*, 1 November 2005

AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, 18 May 2006 incorporating through Change 2, 12 July 2007

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 March 2008

(Added-ACC) AFI63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, 15 Mar 2004 incorporating change 1, 9 November 2009

AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, 17 June 2009.

AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, 19 December 2005

(Added-ACC) AFI91-121, *Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) Program*, 8 November 2010

CJCSI 3263.05, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*,

Forms Adopted.

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

DD Form 1351-2, *Travel Voucher or Sub-voucher*

DD Form 1610, *Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DoD Personnel*.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

(Added-ACC) ACC—Air Combat Command

AFI—Air Force Instruction

ANG—Air National Guard

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

CCC—Combat Crew Communications

CJCSI—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

(Added-ACC) COMACC—Commander, ACC

CP—Command Post

DOD—Department of Defense

DTS—Defense Travel System

EAL—Entry Authorization List

HQ—Headquarters

(Added-ACC) HQ ACC/A10—ACC Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate

ID—Identification

IDS—Intrusion Detection Systems

LAN—Local Area Network

MAJCOM—Major Command

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NCOP—Nuclear Control Order Procedures

NLT—No Later Than

NSSAV—Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit

NSI—Nuclear Surety Inspection

NWSS—Nuclear Weapons Security Standard

OCR—Office of Collateral Responsibility

POC—Point of Contact

PRP—Personnel Reliability Program

RDS—Records Disposition Schedule

SAAM—Special Assignment Airlift Mission

SAV—Staff Assistance Visit

SCAMP—Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable

SOE—Schedule Of Events

SSN—Social Security Number

STRAT—EA--United States Strategic Command Emergency Action

TBD—To Be Determined

TDY—Temporary Duty

TMO—Travel Management Office

TO—Technical Orders

TTP— Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

USAF—United States Air Force

WSA—Weapons Storage Area

Attachment 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT REPORT FORMAT

MAJCOMs will determine which sections of the standardized format apply to their unique mission requirements. This list is not all-inclusive, and MAJCOMs are encouraged to focus on additional areas identified as trends within the MAJCOM or specifically requested by the wing commander. MAJCOMs will adhere to the following format to the maximum extent practical to improve standardization across the USAF.

A2.1. Executive Summary.

- A2.1.1. Management.
- A2.1.2. Operations.
- A2.1.3. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
- A2.1.4. Nuclear Surety Program.
- A2.1.5. Civil Engineers.
- A2.1.6. Munitions.
- A2.1.7. Nuclear Security.
- A2.1.8. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Maintenance.
- A2.1.9. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating Exercise.
- A2.1.10. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.
- A2.1.11. Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM).
- A2.1.12. Vehicle Management.
- A2.1.13. Outstanding Performers.
- A2.1.14. (**Added-ACC**) Area Denial/Anti-Hijacking Exercise.

A2.2. Operations.

- A2.2.1. Nuclear Control Order Procedures (NCOP).
 - A2.2.1.1. Command Post NCOP.
 - A2.2.1.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew NCOP.
- A2.2.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew Nuclear Operations.
 - A2.2.2.1. Combat Mission Folders (CMFs).
 - A2.2.2.2. Positive Control Documents.
 - A2.2.2.3. Coded Switch Procedures.
 - A2.2.2.4. Missile Crew Weapon System Procedures
 - A2.2.2.5. Missile Control Procedures
- A2.2.3. Command Post Security.

A2.2.4. Top Secret Control Accounts (TSCA).

A2.2.5. Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable (SCAMP) Operations.

A2.2.5.1. Fixed Site SCAMP (FSS) Operations.

A2.2.5.2. Mobile SCAMP Operations.

A2.2.6. Combat Crew Communications.

A2.2.6.1. Safe Passage Procedures.

A2.3. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).

A2.3.1. Force Support Squadron (FSS), PRP Satellite Offices, and Unit Programs.

A2.3.2. Medical Treatment Facility Support.

A2.4. Nuclear Surety Program.

A2.4.1. Program Management.

A2.4.2. Inspection Program.

A2.4.3. Nuclear Surety Training.

A2.4.4. Miscellaneous Programs.

A2.5. Civil Engineers.

A2.5.1. Lightning Protection, Static Bonding, and Grounding.

A2.5.2. Emergency Backup Power.

A2.5.3. Nuclear Hoists.

A2.5.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).

A2.5.4.1. Management.

A2.5.4.2. Render Safe/Continuation Procedures.

A2.5.4.3. Emergency Response.

A2.5.5. Earthened Igloo Program

A2.5.6. Nuclear Haul Routes

A2.5.7. Facility Maintenance and Upkeep

A2.6. Munitions

A2.6.1. Management.

A2.6.2. Stockpile and Housekeeping.

A2.6.3. Key and Lock Management.

A2.6.4. Tools, Test, Tiedown and Handling Equipment.

A2.6.5. Technical Operations.

A2.6.6. Munitions Control.

A2.6.7. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating.

A2.6.8. Supply Support.

A2.7. Nuclear Security.

A2.7.1. Operations.

A2.7.2. Administration.

A2.7.3. Training and Resources.

A2.7.4. Standardization/Evaluation.

A2.7.5. Response Force Exercise.

A2.8. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Maintenance.

A2.9. Nuclear Weapon Loading and Mating Exercise.

A2.10. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.

A2.11. Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM).

A2.12. Logistics Readiness.

A2.12.1. Material Management

A2.12.2. Deployment and Distribution

A2.12.3. Vehicle Management

A2.13. Outstanding Performers. *Note 1:* Order categories in each section is as follows:

Strength

Repeat Critical

Critical

Repeat Significant

Significant

Problem

Observation

Note 2: Deficiencies (with references) will include:

Observation (with references).

Impact.

Recommendation.

Attachment 3

PREPARING FOR AN NSSAV

Figure A3.1. NSSAV Preparation Guide. This guide is to assist in NSSAV preparation. MAJCOMs may deviate from this guide as required to meet their requirements.

	START	FINISH
INITIAL NOTIFICATION/SOE PREP:	T-60	T-45
Send “formal” visit message to the unit and info copy the NAF/Center and host MAJCOM (as required).		
Note: Verify NSSAV dates with a POC from the unit prior to formal visit message.		
Determine unit contact (i.e. POC).		
Ensure unit POC begins coordination on the draft Schedule of Events (SOE). (They will usually use prior year’s schedule as a starting point).		
Determine Team Chief. Notify Team Chief of NSSAV dates.		
Update/Verify appropriate MAJCOM Functional Organization list.		
Notify MAJCOM Functional Organizations of the NSSAV date and request team member names, vehicle requirements, and any other special requests (e.g. SF support items).		
Update appropriate MAJCOM long range schedules.		
Schedule conference room for pre-departure briefing.		
TEAM SUPPORT:	T-45	T-25
Get team member names from the staff. Required information: Full Name as it appears on Restricted Area Badge (or military ID), Rank, Last six of SSN, Line Badge number, Unit Designation (as listed on line badge), Security Clearance and Access Codes. Ensure documents created with this information are marked FOUO and contain the Privacy Act Statement.		
For personnel shortages, have appropriate functional area arrange for augmentees. Request NAF/Center augmentees if necessary. Request email address for augmentees in addition to standard team member personal information.		
Send team roster, vehicle needs and special requests to the unit POC so that they can begin making billeting/vehicle/work center arrangements. Update any subsequent changes with POC as they occur. Find out if team will be staying on or off base. Request wing key personnel roster and base map.		
Make travel arrangements for MAJCOM team members (Travel /Aircraft Validation).		
Email team roster/Organizational Defense Travel Administrator (ODTA) fund authorization letter to NSSAV team members for order preparation.		
Email travel information, itinerary, per diem costs, pre-departure briefing time/location and any miscellaneous information to local team members. Have them arrange TDY orders.		
Send team travel info, fund cite/ODTA fund authorization letter and approximate travel/per diem costs to augmentees. Have them make their arrival times as close to the team arrival times as possible, so the base can		

pick everyone up together. Have them cut their own orders.

SOE COORDINATION:

T-40

T-30

Receive draft SOE from wing POC.

E-mail draft SOE to team members for review/input.

Coordinate SOE with other MAJCOMs if conducting multi-MAJCOM NSSAV.

Compile schedule inputs/recommendations/changes.

TRIP PREPARATION ACTIONS:

T-20

T-10

Re-confirm travel, billeting, and transportation arrangements.

Arrange bus transportation to/from airport as required.

Receive travel verification/itineraries from augmentees.

Finalize the schedule with the unit and send to all team members.

Generate EAL for review at pre-departure briefing. Ensure EAL is marked FOUO and contains the Privacy Act Statement. Have team chief sign first sheet.

Prepare laptop computer and/or disk for the visit.

Update the pre-departure briefing with pertinent info.

Verify conference room date/time NLT 7 days prior to briefing.

TEAM CHIEF BOOK:

T-14

T-3

Build/present team chief book NLT the day before the brief. Include: team roster, EAL, schedule of events, wing key personnel list, base map, unit observation forms, travel itinerary, inbrief, draft outbrief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, **AFI 91-XXX**, and a copy of the unit's previous NSSAV report.

TEAM DOCUMENTS:

T-14

T-3

Assemble team member documents. Include: finalized schedule, unit/team member observation forms, outstanding performer forms, team roster, wing key personnel list, pre-departure briefing, draft outbrief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, **AFI 91-XXX**, and anything else that might be useful.

PRE-DEPARTURE BRIEF:

T-3

T-3

Email out team documents.

Present briefing and address any outstanding issues.

Have team members review EAL for correctness.

CONDUCT NSSAV**T-0****T+5****POST TDY ACTIONS:****T+6****T+25**

Email Executive Summary of report to appropriate distribution.

Send out Augmentee "Thank You" letters from Lead Division.

Send CRITICAL DISCREPANCY message to wing, listing a MAJCOM POC for each CRITICAL DISCREPANCY (usually the NSSAV team member that authored the observation in the NSSAV Report).

CRITICAL OBSERVATION RESOLUTION:**T+6****T+60**

Receive NSSAV CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES resolution message from wing.

CRITICAL DEFICIENCY RESOLUTION – MAJCOM COORDINATION:**T+60****T+90**

Forward resolution message to appropriate MAJCOM POCs.

Once all MAJCOM POCs are satisfied that the wing's corrective action address the root cause of the discrepancy, the lead division will forward a message to the wing to confirm that all CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES have been closed.